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• We introduce an assignment problem where some agents act autonomously.
• Many real-world problems fall under this assignment model.
• Matching theory is used to model the assignment of autonomous agents to tasks.
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• We transform the problem into a computationally simpler bilinear problem.
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a b s t r a c t
We analyse assignment problems in which not every agent is controlled by the central planner. The
autonomous agents search for vacant tasks guided by their own preference orders over available tasks.
The goal of the central planner is to maximise the total value of the assignment, taking into account
the behaviour of the uncontrolled agents. Such optimisation problems arise in numerous real-world
situations, ranging from organisational economics to ‘‘crowdsourcing’’ and disaster response. We show
that the problem faced by the central planner can be transformed into amixed integer bilevel optimisation
problem. Then we demonstrate how this program can be reduced to a disjoint bilinear program, which is
much more manageable computationally.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Problems in economic theory are traditionally analysed in terms
of stable outcomes (equilibria) or efficient solutions (optima). In
the former case, the problem is considered in the context of the
interaction of rational, self-interested, autonomous agents; in the
latter, the agents are assumed to follow the instructions of the
central planner who aims to optimise some objective. Of course,
in realistic economic systems autonomous agents are often placed
together with those controlled by the central planner, like public
and private sectors jointly tackling social problems or locating
economic activities. Typically, the autonomous agents will act to
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0165-4896/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.obtain their own individual goals, and the problem of the central
planner is to coordinate the controlled agents so as to optimise the
overall performance of the system, while taking into account the
behaviour of self-motivated participants.
The present paper investigates a particular ‘‘semi-autonomous’’
scenario of this kind, namely assignment problems in which some
of the players are autonomous and face private incentives to solve
certain tasks. Instead of submitting to the planner’s will, these
agents strive to obtain the task that rates most highly according
to their own preference rankings.
The contribution of this paper is both conceptual and technical.
On the conceptual level we introduce a model to handle selfish
behaviour in assignment scenarios. We call this variation of the
assignment problem the Semi-Autonomous Assignment Problem
(SAAP). When all agents are fully controlled by the CP, the SAAP
turns into a classical assignment problem.
In our model, the autonomous agents, amended to the classical
assignment problem, are assumed to have ordinal preferences
over the available tasks. This arguably increases the robustness
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planner to form a belief about cardinal utility functions of the
autonomous agents, nor do we assume the autonomous agents
to be von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility maximisers.
Likewise, adopting ordinal preferences allows us to directly utilise
results from a branch of game theory, usually called matching
theory, which originated with the seminal paper of Gale and
Shapley (1962). From the start, matching theory evolved without
drawing on the theory of expected utility.
Part of our technical contribution is to show that the optimal
solution of an SAAP from the point of view of the central planner
corresponds to a stable matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962) in a
particular marriage market1 formed by autonomous agents and
tasks. In this market, the preferences of the autonomous agents
are their rankings over tasks, while the values of the ‘‘assignment
matrix’’ determine the preferences of the tasks. By assigning the
controlled agents, the central planner can block some tasks and
in this way essentially determine the market in which the stable
matching is formed. The seemingly strong assumption that the
central planner moves first does not affect the generality of our
model.Making use of a result frommatching literature, in Section 3
we argue that the outcome will be the same if the central planner
does not move first. This is true as long as the central planner
has the prerogative to assign his controlled agents to tasks even if
they were already taken by autonomous agents (who in that case
become unassigned again).
As we show, the optimisation problem faced by the central
planner can be represented as a mixed integer bilevel optimisation
problem—a hierarchical program where the set of constraints
contains a parametric optimisation problem. Solving bilevel
programs is difficult in general, and known algorithms would deal
with only extremely small problem instances. We then show how
to reduce this bilevel program to a disjoint bilinear program, using
the special structure of the SAAP. A disjoint bilinear program is
much more manageable computationally, as it only involves a
single minimisation problem instead of a minimax problem.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2motivates
our work by describing several real-life situations which resemble
SAAPs. Themodel is then formally defined in Section 3. In Section 4
we present our main results—the transformation of the SAAP to
a mixed integer bilevel optimisation problem and the reduction
of that problem to a disjoint bilinear program. We conclude in
Section 5 with directions for future work.
2. Real-world examples
Semi-autonomous assignment problems arise naturally in
the context of location of economic activities. In Koopmans and
Beckmann (1957), for example, the authors discuss the assignment
problem in the context of choosing locations for industrial
plants under the standard assumption that the central planner is
responsible for choosing the location for all of the plants. However,
in reality such tasks are typically divided between the public and
the private sectors, where private businesses strive to maximise
their ownprofits and the government is concernedwith the overall
welfare of the society. Note also that state institutions often have
the priority over private entrepreneurs in making their choices,
consistent with the assumptions of our model.
As another example, consider private–public partnerships (PPP),
where the public party, which usually supervises the complete
project, intends to advance some public goal. In contrast, the
participating private parties are primarily interested in their
own profits. This poses an obstacle for assigning tasks in a
1 Technically, a marriage market is a one-to-one two-sided matching problem.globally optimal way. Companies will try to avoid those tasks
which are unprofitable and difficult, trying instead to obtain
subprojects promising high profits at low risk. A typical example
is the provision of health care through hospitals and doctors,
which is facilitated through private–public partnerships in many
countries.2 The payment agreements between the government
and the private partners usually do not reimburse a hospital or
doctor for exactly those costs associated with a specific patient.
As a result, patients (=‘‘tasks’’) yield different profit opportunities.
Although hospitals/doctors (=‘‘agents’’) participating in a PPP are
not formally entitled to pick the profitable patients and reject the
others, theremay be informalways to deter unprofitable patients.3
Themodel presented in this paper canhelp to designpolicieswhich
take the selfish behaviour of private contractors into account.
In the internet economy, many crowdsourcing systems (see,
e.g., Benkler, 2006, Brabham, 2008 and Howe, 2008) can be
modelled as SAAPs. In a crowdsourcing system, taskswhich cannot
satisfactorily be solved without human expertise are assigned to
a group of more or less anonymous amateur problem solvers (the
‘‘crowd’’). Yet companiesmaking use of crowdsourcing do not have
to totally rely on the crowd. For some of the tasks or even for
all of them, they can engage professional problem solvers. These
belong to their own personnel or a contractor’s personnel who
cannot reject tasks assigned to them. In contrast, crowd members
can freely choosewhich tasks towork on, and they are probably not
indifferent between all tasks. Hence, the firmhas to find an optimal
way of distributing its tasks between professional and amateur
problem solvers.
Disaster response situations, providing prominent examples of
crowdsourcing, can also be analysed with our model. Consider
a disaster relief situation where professional disaster responders
coordinated by the government are assisted by local residents and
disaster survivors. The government has neither the communication
capabilities nor the authority to tell local participants what to
do. However, local participants are very helpful and their efforts
should not be ignored. Assuming the government can estimate the
preferences of local participants (e.g., they visit sites in order of
distance from their home), our work provides amore effectiveway
for the government to assign professional disaster responders.
Finally, autonomous task choice can even be observed in
military organisations, which are famous for their strict adherence
to the principle of obeying orders.4 If solving critical tasks is
‘‘prestigious’’ in some sense, there may be an incentive for military
officers to unilaterally go for those critical tasks, disregarding the
assignment the central planner would prefer. In military history
it regularly occurred that ambitious commanders tried to gain
fame by acting more bravely or by taking greater risks than
desired by the central command. An outstanding example is the
celebrated Danish naval officer Peter Jansen Wessel (1691–1720),
2 For an overview of private–public partnerships in the health sector, see Nikolic
and Maikisch (2006).
3 By entering ‘‘hospital turns away’’ or a similar phrase into an internet search
engine, one gets plenty of media reports about exactly this issue. For example, UK
dentists, working for the National Health Service, arguably behaved in such a way
(see Templeton, 2007). Reports about hospitals being reluctant to examine patients
with X-ray or brain scans may straightforwardly be interpreted as avoidance of
unprofitable tasks.
4 Situations resembling SAAPs can be found not only within military organisa-
tions. The 2011war in Libyawas fought by a coalition ofNATO and loosely organised
rebel troops, cooperating in their efforts to overthrow the regime of dictatorMuam-
mar Gaddafi. While the NATO forces were totally coordinated, it was arguably dif-
ficult to coordinate the actions of the rebels, who were untrained, unprofessional,
and lacked command chains. Consequently, the NATO, as the central planner of the
SAAP, had to anticipate the prospective actions of the rebels when making its de-
cisions on air strikes. Information about the rebels’ next steps was provided by so-
called liaison officers (NATO representatives assigned to the rebel units).
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strived for the most prestigious tasks in the Great Northern
War (1700–1721), thereby notoriously disobeying orders.5 His
confrontation with the Swedish fleet in the Battle of Dynekilen
(1716) in which his 7 ships captured 31 Swedish ships and
destroyed another 13, was not backed by orders of the admiralty.6
Wessel’s anarchistic conduct evoked considerable criticism in
the Danish admiralty, eventually leading to a trial at a court-
martial. Yet he was acquitted and even made an admiral later.7
His disobedience yielded huge personal prestige, as can be seen
from the fact thatWessel is praised in the national anthems of both
Denmark and Norway (the country he originated from).
3. The model
Before formally defining our model, we recall the definition of
a classical Assignment Problem (AP). An AP is defined by a triple
(A, T , v), where A is a set of agents, T is a set of tasks, and v is an
evaluation function which maps A× T into R+ ∪ {0}. The problem
is to find an assignment (or,matching) of agents to tasks for which
the sum of the values of pairs matched is maximised. Formally, an
assignmentµ is a subset of A× T such that no two distinct pairs in
µ share a player or a task, that is:
(a, t), (aˆ, tˆ) ∈ µ : (a, t) ≠ (aˆ, tˆ)⇒ a ≠ aˆ ∧ t ≠ tˆ.
The objective of the central planner is then given by
max
µ∈µ

(a,t)∈µ
v(a, t),
with µ being the set of all assignments which can be formed from
the set A× T .
We now generalise the AP model to what we call the Semi-
Autonomous Assignment Problem (SAAP). An SAAP is defined by a
tuple
(C ∪ F , T , v,≻F ),
where C and F are two disjoint sets, and we set A := C ∪ F . As
before, we refer to the elements of A as agents, while the members
of C are termed coordinated (or, controlled), and the members of F
are referred to as free (or, autonomous). The function v is defined as
before, and≻F is a strict8 preference profilewhich contains for each
free agent f ∈ F a linear preference order≻f defined over T . Given
this, the central planner of an SAAP aims to find
max
µ∈µSAAP

(a,t)∈µ
v(a, t),
where µSAAP is the set of SAAP-feasible assignments defined later.
First we specify the behaviour of the free agents.
We now specify a search process such that keeping to this
process is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each free agent.
After the coordinated agents were assigned to tasks by the
central planner, each free agent f approaches his most preferred
task t := max≻f T . If f finds t to be vacant, f takes over t . If f
finds that a coordinated player already occupies t, f proceeds to
the task which is second according to the preferences ≻f , namely
5 For an account of his deeds, see Chapter 1 (‘‘A Knight Errant of the Seas’’) in Riis
(2007).
6 ‘‘He could not go back and ask for permission, and onemay shrewdly guess that
he did not want to, for it would certainly have been refused.’’ (Riis, 2007, p. 10).
7 Cf. Riis (2007, pp. 6 and 9).
8 The assumption of strict preferences is common inmatching literature (e.g., see
Chapter 2 in Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). In deriving our results, we make use of
one of the standard results in matching theory (Corollary 2.14, p. 33, in Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990) which holds only for strict preferences.t ′ := max≻f T \ {t}. Again, f checks the availability of t ′ and either
takes it or continues with the subsequent item in its priority list.
If there are no tasks left on f ’s priority list which were not yet
approached, f stays idle. If k ≥ 2 free agents f1, . . . , fk approach
the same task t , we assume that the agent best at performing the
task, i.e.
argmax
a∈{f1,...,fk}
v(a, t)
keeps to t , while the other free agents continue the search process.
This is a realistic assumption for scenarios in which free players,
though being uncoordinated, have an interest in a high-valued
solution of the problem (like in the disaster response application
outlined in Section 2). We make the restriction that v(a, t) ≠
v(a′, t) if a ≠ a′.9 With these assumptions, the central planner
affects the outcome of the search process because tasks assigned
to the controlled agents are unavailable to the free agents.
If the behaviour of the free agents is modelled in this way, the
search process coincides with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
of Gale and Shapley (1962) with men proposing, where:
• The free agents in F are the men and the tasks in T are the
women.
• The men’s preferences are given by≻F .
• The women’s preferences are given by the valuation function v,
i.e. for each t ∈ T we have
f ≻t f ′ ⇔ v(f , t) > v(f ′, t). (3.1)
• Some tasks are blocked, namely those that are occupied by
controlled agents.
We call this procedure the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with
Blocked Tasks (DAB).
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962)
constructs a stable matching in a marriage market. A marriage
market is defined as a triple (M,W ,≻), whereM is the set of ‘‘men’’
andW is the set of ‘‘women’’. A preference profile≻maps eachm ∈
M into a linear preference order defined over W ∪ {m}, and each
w ∈ W into a linear preference order defined overM ∪ {w}.10,11
From the fact that the deferred acceptance algorithm is finite
and produces a unique output (Gale and Shapley, 1962), it follows
that the DAB search process is finite and produces a unique output.
It is a dominant strategy equilibrium for each agent from
the male side to reveal its preferences truthfully (see Theorem
5 in Roth, 1982). In our model, revealing preferences is done
via the order in which tasks are approached. Since our search
process specifies that tasks are approached in the order given by
agent’s preferences and since our search process coincides with
the deferred acceptance algorithm, itmeans that straightforwardly
following their preferences is a dominant strategy for the agents,
i.e. the free agents cannot improve their outcome by changing the
order in which they approach tasks.
McVitie and Wilson (1971) modified the original algorithm of
Gale and Shapley (1962) so as to let men propose to women in
a random sequence (in Gale and Shapley, 1962, the men propose
simultaneously at each stage). They proved that the matching
resulting from their algorithm is identical to the one generated
by the standard deferred acceptance algorithm. This finding of
9 In the marriage market we define, this restriction will ensure that ‘‘preferences
of tasks’’ are strict. This assumption is needed for our results (see also Footnote 8
above).
10 It is a common notation that the item m in the domain of a man’s preference
order and the item w in the domain of a woman’s preference order stand for
remaining single.
11 For a comprehensive discussion of marriage markets, see Roth and Sotomayor
(1990, Chapter 2).
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algorithm is not affected by our assumption that the central
planner assigns the coordinated agents first; in the DAB search
process, the output matching would be the same even if the CP
would assign the controlled agents when the free agents were
already searching in the market. This is true as long as the
coordinated agents could take away any task already occupied
by a free agent, an assumption we consider reasonable for those
applications we described in Section 2.
Wedefine a coordinated assignment to be amatchingµC ⊆ C×T
(no free player f is a member of any pair in µC ). We denote by
(F , T ,≻F )µC a marriage market formed by free agents and those
tasks which are not matched under µC . Formally,
(F , T ,≻)µC = (F , T \ {t | (c, t) ∈ µC },≻). (3.2)
Here≻ is a preference profile which assigns to each t ∈ T a linear
order ≻t according to (3.1) and to each free agent the order ≻f .
Given this, the set µSAAP consists of the following assignments:
Definition 1. An assignment µ is SAAP-feasible for a semi-
autonomous assignment problem (C ∪ F , T , v,≻F ) ifµ = µF ∪µC
and the matching µF is the outcome of the DAB in the market
(F , T ,≻F )µC .
4. Solution
In this section, we first state the problem as a mathematical
program. We then transform the program so that it becomes
computationally manageable. Let binary variables xij indicate
whether a controlled agent i ∈ C is assigned to task j ∈ T , i.e. if
xij = 1, then i is assigned to j, and if xij = 0, then this is not the case.
Likewise, variables yij indicatedwhether a free agent i ismatched to
task j. x and y arematriceswith |C | rows and |F | rows, respectively.
Both of them have |T | columns and their elements are either 0 or 1.
Theorem 1. The solution to the Semi-Autonomous Assignment
problem
(C ∪ F , T , v,≻F ),
coincides with the solution to the optimisation problem12
max
x

(i,j)∈(C×T )
vijxij + g(x), (4.1)
s.t.

j∈T
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C (4.2)
i∈A
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T (4.3)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ (C × T ) (4.4)
where g(x) is the value of the allocation of free agents to the tasks not
assigned to controlled agents by x, i.e.
g(x) = min
y

(i,j)∈(F×T )
vijyij (4.5)
s.t.

j∈T
yij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ F (4.6)
i∈F
yij ≤ 1−

i∈C
xij ∀j ∈ T (4.7)
yij +

k≻i j
yik +

l≻j i
ylj ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T ) (4.8)
yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T ). (4.9)
12 In the optimisation problems we use the notation vij instead of v(i, j) to denote
the value of the assignment of agent i to task j.Proof. First of all, we show that the solution of the mathematical
programabove corresponds to amatching. Constraint (4.2) requires
each controlled agent to be assigned at most one task and
constraint (4.3) requires each task to be allocated to at most one
controlled agent. Likewise, constraint (4.6) requires each free agent
to be assigned at most one task and constraint (4.7) requires a
controlled task to be allocated to no free agent if it is already
occupied by a controlled agent, or to at most one free agent
otherwise. Constraints (4.4) and (4.9) ensure that all variables xij
and yij are binary.
Next, we show that the matrix y determined in the solution of
the program corresponds to the outcome of the DAB procedure
when only those tasks are available which are not occupied by
controlled agents. As mentioned, (4.7) ensures that no free agent
is matched to a task assigned to a controlled agent. As we showed
in Section 3, the DAB procedure converges to a stable matching
in a marriage market (F , T ,≻F )µC (cf. (3.2) above). We now have
to show that the matrix y in a solution of the program above
corresponds (1) to a stable matching in the market (F , T ,≻F )µC ,
where µC is determined by the matrix x, and (2) that this stable
matching corresponds to that stable matching chosen by the free
agents in the DAB search process.
For ensuring that y corresponds to a stable matching in
the market (F , T ,≻F )µC , we include the so-called blocking
pair constraint (4.8). This constraint is taken from Roth et al.
(1993), who develop stable matching theory in a mathematical
programming framework. If (4.8) is fulfilled, there can be no
blocking pairs.
Finally, we have to show that the matching y derived from the
solution of the above program is not just stable, but it is indeed
the same stable matching as the one constructed through the
DAB procedure. In DAB, free agents represent the proposing side,
and the procedure converges to a stable matching that is optimal
for the free agents: each free agent prefers this stable matching
to any other stable matching (see Gale and Shapley, 1962). The
optimal stable matching for the proposing side coincides with the
worst stablematching of the responding side (Roth and Sotomayor,
1990, Theorem 2.13 and Corollary 2.14, p. 33), which means
that each task that is not occupied by a controlled agent prefers
any other stable matching in the market (F , T ,≻F )µC over the
matching selected through DAB. Let t be a task which is not
occupied by a controlled agent and let (t, f ∗) be the pair formed
under the matching constructed through the DAB algorithm.
Moreover, let B(t) ⊆ T × F be the set
B(t)
:= {(t, f ) | (t, f ) ⊆ µ,µ is a stable matching in (F , T ,≻F )µC }.
By definition of the ‘‘preferences’’ of the tasks (see (3.1) above) the
fact that the constructed matching is the task-worst implies that
(t, f ∗) = argmin
(t,f )∈B(t)
v(t, f ).
Put differently, if Ft denotes the set of free agents that perform
task t in some stable matching in the market (F , T ,≻F )µC , then, in
the free-agent-optimal matching, task t is performed by the least-
qualified among these agents—argminf∈Ft v(t, f ).
It follows that the objective function for the assignment of free
agents, which corresponds to the matching chosen by the DAB
algorithm in the market (F , T ,≻F )µC , is given by (4.5). 
The integrality constraint (4.9) can be relaxed as has been
shown by Vande Vate (1989, Theorem 16), allowing to replace it
with a nonnegativity constraint.
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mixed integer linear program SAAP(2LMILP):
max
x

(i,j)∈(C×T )
vijxij +

(i,j)∈(F×T )
vijyij
s.t.

j∈T
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C
i∈C
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ (C × T )
y solves min

(i,j)∈(F×T )
vijyij
j∈T
yij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ F
i∈F
yij ≤ 1−

i∈C
xij ∀j ∈ T
yij +

k≻i j
yik +

l≻j i
ylj ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
yij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T ).
Formally, we have a mixed integer bilevel optimisation
problem—a hierarchical program in which the set of constraints
contains a parametric optimisation problem. Solving bilevel pro-
grams is difficult in general, let alone solving one with binary vari-
ables, and applying known algorithms to the program at hand
would yield solutions only for extremely small problem instances.
Themost popularmethod for solving bilevel programs is to replace
the second levelwith a set of Karush–Kuhn–Tucker optimality con-
ditions and then add these constraints to the first level to form a
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) (Luo
et al., 1996). However, this introduces a set of complementary con-
straints that are difficult to deal with.13 In fact, solving a linear
bilevel program inwhich all functions are linear is already strongly
NP-hard (Marcotte and Savard, 2005).14 In our case, the upper level
contains binary variables and hence the problem is even more dif-
ficult.
For devising a way how to practically solve the SAAP
problem, we will show that (SAAP(2LMILP)) is equivalent to
a disjoint bilinear program, which is much more manageable
computationally,15 as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The SAAP bilevel mixed integer linear programming
model (SAAP(2LMILP)) is equivalent to the following disjoint bilinear
program SAAP(DBL):
max
x,λ,β,γ

i∈C,j∈T
vijxij +

i∈F
λi +

j∈T
βj

1−

i∈C
xij

+

(i,j)∈(F×T )
γij
s.t.

j∈T
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C
i∈C
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T
xij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ (C × T )
λi + βj + γij +

k≺i j
γik +

l≺j i
γlj ≤ vij ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
λ ≤ 0, β ≤ 0, γ ≥ 0.
13 The complementary constraints can then be transformed into a new set of con-
straints that involve integer variables using a Big-M method. Alternatively, non-
linear programming relaxation can be used to approximate these complementary
constraints.
14 Even checking local optimality in linear bilevel programming is NP-hard, cf.
Marcotte and Savard (2005).
15 Although solving bilinear programs is still NP-hard (Audet et al., 1999), the
mathematical programming formulation is in amuchnicer form, i.e.we only have to
deal with a single minimisation problem instead of a minimax problem. Notice that
not all linear bilevel programs can be transformed into a bilinear problem.However,
a disjoint bilinear program can be transformed into a linear bilevel program.At a high level, the transformation of (SAAP(2LMILP)) into a
bilinear program involves three steps. First, we replace the linear
program on the second level with its dual. Since the primal was a
minimisation problem, the dual is amaximisation problem. Having
maximisation in both first and second stages lets us combine the
objectives and reduce the problem to a single-stage optimisation.
The resulting problem belongs to the class of mixed integer non-
convex quadratic programming problems and is still quite difficult
to solve. We then exploit the special structure of the problem to
note that the integrality constraints on x can be dropped obtaining
a bilinear program. The details follow in the proof.
Proof. Let λi, βj and γij be dual variables for constraints (4.6)–(4.8)
for all (i, j) ∈ (F × T ). The dual problem is formulated as:
max
λ,β,γ

i∈F
λi +

j∈T

1−

i∈C
xij

βj +

(i,j)∈(F×T )
γij
s.t. λi + βj + γij +

k≺i j
γik +

l≺j i
γlj ≤ vij ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
λ ≤ 0, β ≤ 0, γ ≥ 0.
Plugging the dual into the original problem and combining two
max operators, we obtain the following problem:
max
x,λ,β,γ

i∈C,j∈T
vijxij +

i∈F
λi +

j∈T
βj

1−

i∈C
xij

+

(i,j)∈(F×T )
γij
s.t.

j∈T
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C
i∈C
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ (C × T )
λi + βj + γij +

k≻i j
γik +

l≻j i
γlj ≤ vij ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
λ ≤ 0, β ≤ 0, γ ≥ 0.
The objective function contains linear terms on (x,λ,β, γ) and
a bilinear term −((i,j)∈(C×T ) βjxij). Without this bilinear term,
the problem will be equivalent to two separate optimisation
problems: an assignment problemand a (dual of a) stablematching
problem. Due to the presence of the bilinear terms together with
the integrality constraint on xij, this problem belongs to the class
of mixed integer non-convex quadratic programming problems
and is quite difficult to solve. However, once we fix (λ,β, γ), the
objective function is linear on x. The problem becomes:
max
x

i∈C,j∈T
(vij − βj)xij
s.t.

j
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C
i∈C
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T
xij ∈ {0, 1}.
This is an assignment problem,16 and hence the integrality
constraint can be relaxed (see, for example, Bertsimas and
Tsitsiklis, 1997, Corollary 7.2). Thus, for every solution λ,β, γ (or
equivalently, for every y) to the agent-optimal stable matching
problem, there is an integer solution x that is optimal. In other
16 In the variant of the assignment problem stated here, the number of tasks may
be different from the number of agents and tasks/agents may be left unassigned.
One can convert this version to the standard assignment problemby adding dummy
tasks/agents.
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we can drop the integrality constraints in SAAP. This leads to the
disjoint bilevel program SAAP(DBL). 
There is an extensive literature on bilinear programming. In
particular, a simple greedy approach, such as ‘hill climbing’ (see,
e.g., Russell and Norvig, 2003), may obtain high-quality solutions
in little time. This is done by iteratively solving an LP for optimal
(λ,β, γ) for each fixed x and then solving another LP for an optimal
x by fixing the newly found (λ,β, γ). This process is repeated until
the optimal value does not improve. At that point we obtain a
locally optimal solution. It is noted also that the disjoint constraint
sets in the SAAP problem are quite nice. The constraints on x
define an assignment polyhedron with known extreme points and
the constraints on (λ,β, γ) correspond to a dual feasible space of
the stable matching problem. This means the LP problems can be
solved very efficiently and the algorithm converges very fast to a
local optimal solution. White (1992) converts a bilinear program
into a big LP whose constraints are generated sequentially through
solving smaller LPs. This methods promises finite convergence and
can be used to solve SAAP(DBL) as the assignment problem and
the stable matching problem can be solved very efficiently. The
bilinear program can also be reduced to a concave minimisation
problem where an outer approximation algorithm can be applied
(Thieu, 1988). More recent advanced methods for solving disjoint
bilinear programming can be found in Alarie et al. (2001) who
apply cutting plane methods to produce global optimal solutions.
Alarie et al. (2001) show that cutting plane methods can be used
to solve disjoint bilinear programming problems with up to 500
variables in each disjoint set and with 100 constraints.
5. Conclusions
Our work introduces assignment problems in which au-
tonomous agents are placed togetherwith those fully controlled by
a central planner. The autonomous agents act to obtain their own
individual goals. The central planner coordinates the controlled
agentswith the aim to optimise the overall performance of the sys-
tem, while taking into account the behaviour of the self-motivated
participants. This scenario resembles many economic situations,
some of which were outlined in Section 2.
Clearly, the search process assumed for the free agents in SAAP
is not the only reasonable model. Indeed, there are many other
possibilities for how one could model the behaviour of the free
agents. For example, many real-world scenarios could be better
describedwith a stochastic search process. Onemight also consider
search strategies taken from cognitive psychology, like the famous
satisficing heuristic of Simon (1957) or the take-the-best heuristic
of Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996). It may be a worthwhile effort
to perform a similar analysis like the one presented in this paper,
but with alternative behavioural assumptions for the free agents.
Despite of its various reasonable alternatives, we want to stress
that the search processmodelled in this article has some intriguing
features. Firstly, it is quite natural to assume that the free agents
check for free tasks according to some linear order. Secondly,
the outcome assignment does not hinge on the assumption that
controlled agents are assigned first. This follows from McVitie and
Wilson (1971), as discussed in Section 3. Thirdly, in the deferred
acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) there is no
incentive for the proposing side, in our case the free agents, to
misrepresent their preferences (cf. Dubins and Freedman, 1981
and Roth, 1982). In our context, this means that the free agents
cannot improve their outcome by changing the order in which
they approach tasks. So, even if free agents would have enough
information and computing power to act strategically, it would not
be worthwhile doing so. In contrast, alternative models of searchbehaviour would have to take care of strategic manipulations on
the free agents’ parts. Admittedly, the latter two points make
handling our model merely convenient, while they provide no
support for the empirical validity of the DAB assumption.
Other modifications to our model come to mind. It may be
interesting to change the informational assumptions of the model.
What if the productivities of the autonomous workers for different
tasks is private knowledge of that worker?17 Would there be a
way to make the free agents reveal their private information?
Could they even be incentivised to pick the task which would be
best from the central planner’s point of view? Designing a transfer
scheme to achieve such goals would demand the free agents to be
modelled with cardinal preferences. Arguably, this would reduce
the robustness of the model, but it might lead to economically
interesting dynamics similar to those which can be found in the
famous labour market adjustment models of Crawford and Knoer
(1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982).
The idea of introducing autonomous agents in scenarios where
the central planner normally has full control is not limited
to assignment problems. Many other standard problems could
be extended to include autonomous agents. Transportation or
network flow with some transfers performed by autonomous
agents, knapsack where autonomous agents are able to add their
own items to the knapsack, and graph colouring with some nodes
coloured by the agents are just a few examples.
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